The inefficiency of private financial contracts under asymmetric information: implications for bank regulation, deposit insurance and disintermediation

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The inefficiency of private financial contracts under asymmetric information: implications for bank regulation, deposit insurance and disintermediation

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Arnold Kling

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Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Research Papers in Banking and Financial Economics with number 91.

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Date of creation: 1986
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgbf:91

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