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Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk

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Mark L . J. Wright

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Abstract

What has been the effect of the shift in emerging market capital flows toward private sector borrowers? Are emerging market capital flows more efficient? If not, can controls on capital flows improve welfare? This paper shows that the answers depend on the form of default risk. When private loans are enforceable, but there is the risk that the government will default on behalf of all residents, private lending is inefficient and capital controls are potentially Pareto-improving. However, when private agents may individually default, capital flow subsidies are potentially Pareto-improving.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its series Pacific Basin Working Paper Series with number 2004-34.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfpb:2004-34

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Keywords: Capital market ; Risk;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cole, Harold L. & English, William B., 1991. "Expropriation and direct investment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 201-227, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2002. "Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 9077, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(4), pages 865-88, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Inci Ötker & Akira Ariyoshi & Jorge Iván Canales Kriljenko & Karl Friedrich Habermeier & Andrei Kirilenko & Bernard Laurens, 2000. "Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization," IMF Occasional Papers 190, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  5. Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 2000. "Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 775-798, July.
  6. Karsten Jeske, 2005. "Private international debt with risk of repudiation," Working Paper 2001-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  7. Chang, Roberto, 1995. "Private Investment and Sovereign Debt Negotiations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 387-405, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Cole, Harold L. & English, William B., 1992. "Two-sided expropriation and international equity contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 77-104, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michael Tomz & Mark L. J. Wright, 2008. "Sovereign Theft: Theory And Evidence About Sovereign Default And Expropriation," CAMA Working Papers 2008-07, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gao, Xiang, 2009. "Private Debt with Pervasive Default Risk," MPRA Paper 17126, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Nov 2009. [Downloadable!]
  3. Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2003. "Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement," Staff Report 307, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Christian Hellwig & Guido Lorenzoni, 2006. "Bubbles and Self-enforcing Debt," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000383, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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