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Deposit insurance, regulatory forbearance and economic growth: implications for the Japanese banking crisis

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Robert Dekle
Kenneth Kletzer

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Abstract

An endogenous growth model with financial intermediation is used to show how public deposit insurance and weak prudential regulation can lead to banking crises and permanent declines in economic growth. The impact of regulatory forbearance on investment, saving and asset price dynamics under perfect foresight are derived in the model. The assumptions of the theoretical model are based on essential features of the Japanese financial system and its regulation. The model demonstrates how banking and growth crises can evolve under perfect foresight. The dynamics for economic aggregates and asset prices predicted by the model are shown to be generally consistent with the experience of the Japanese economy and financial system through the 1990s. We also test our maintained hypothesis of rational expectations using asset price data for Japan over the 1980s and 1990s. An implication of our analysis is that delaying the resolution of banking crises adversely affects future economic growth.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its series Pacific Basin Working Paper Series with number 2004-26.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfpb:2004-26

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Keywords: Financial crises - Japan Deposit insurance Bank supervision Economic development

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  1. Dekle, Robert & Kletzer, Kenneth, 2003. "The Japanese banking crisis and economic growth: Theoretical and empirical implications of deposit guarantees and weak financial regulation," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 305-335, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Robert Dekle & Kenneth Kletzer, 2002. "Financial intermediation, agency, and collateral and the dynamics of banking crises: theory and evidence for the Japanese banking crisis," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 02-10, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Kwon, Eunkyung, 1998. "Monetary Policy, Land Prices, and Collateral Effects on Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 175-203, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Robert Dekle & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2001. "Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises: Theory and Empirical Evidence from East Asia," NBER Working Papers 8322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, 1999. "The Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come From and How Will It End?," NBER Working Papers 7250, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Menzie D. Chinn & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2000. "International Capital Inflows, Domestic Financial Intermediation and Financial Crises under Imperfect Information," NBER Working Papers 7902, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Ogawa, K. & Kitasaka, S.-I., 2000. "Bank Lending in Japan: its Determinants and Macroeconomic Implications," Papers 505, Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research.
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