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Determinants of voluntary bank disclosure: evidence from Japanese Shinkin banks

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  • Mark M. Spiegel
  • Nobuyoshi Yamori

Abstract

Disclosure is widely regarded as a necessary condition for market discipline in a modern financial sector. However, the determinants of disclosure decisions are still unknown, particularly among banks. This paper investigates the determinants of disclosure by Japanese Shinkin banks in 1996 and 1997. This period is unique because disclosure by these banks was voluntary during this time. We find that banks with more serious bad loan problems, more leverage, less competitive pressure, and smaller banks were less likely to choose to voluntarily disclose. These results suggest that there may be a role for compulsory disclosure, as weak banks appear to disproportionately avoid voluntary disclosure.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its series Pacific Basin Working Paper Series with number 03-03.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfpb:03-03

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Keywords: Japan;

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References

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  1. Anil K. Kashyap, 2002. "Sorting Out Japan's Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 9384, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Kano, Masaji & Tsutsui, Yoshiro, 2003. "Geographical segmentation in Japanese bank loan markets," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 157-174, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mathias HOFFMANN & OKUBO Toshihiro, 2012. "By a Silken Thread: Regional banking integration and pathways to financial development in Japan's Great Recession," Discussion papers, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) 12026, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  2. Kondo, Kazumine, 2010. "What Promotes Japanese Regional Banks to Disclose Credit Ratings Voluntarily?," MPRA Paper 20468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Mark Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2004. "Market price accounting and depositor discipline in Japanese regional banks," Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2004-27, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  4. Yamori, Nobuyoshi & Tomimura, Kei & Harimaya, Kozo, 2009. "What kinds of credit associations favor introducing new financial technology?," MPRA Paper 19355, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. WATANABE Wako, 2007. "How Do Relationship Lenders Price Loans to Small Firms?: "Hold-Up" Costs, Transparency, and Private and Public Security," Discussion papers, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) 07058, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  6. Frederick T. Furlong & Robard Williams, 2006. "Financial market signals and banking supervision: are current practices consistent with research findings?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 17-29.
  7. Spiegel, Mark M. & Yamori, Nobuyoshi, 2007. "Market price accounting and depositor discipline: The case of Japanese regional banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 769-786, March.
  8. Elizabeth de Almeida Neves Di Beneditto & Raimundo Nonato Sousa da Silva, 2008. "Analysis of the Disclosure Level by Brazilian Financial Institutions Following the Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) – A multiple case study," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 5(3), pages 181-197, September.
  9. Kazumine Kondo, 2010. "What Promotes Japanese Regional Banks to Disclose Credit Ratings Voluntarily?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(2), pages 1091-1104.

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