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The value of banking relationships during a financial crisis: evidence from failures of Japanese banks

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Author Info
Elijah Brewer, III
Hesna Genay
William Curt Hunter
George G. Kaufman
Abstract

In this paper, we provide evidence on the value of banking relationships by examining the stock market valuation impact of three large bank failures in Japan in 1997 and 1998 on their clients and the clients of surviving banks. Bank failures are theorized to have adverse consequences for other firms in general and for customers of the failed institutions in particular. Firms that are customers of the failed institution may be adversely affected because they may lose an ongoing source of funding and need to incur the expense of search and providing financial and other information about themselves to new lenders. Firms that are not customers of the failed bank may be adversely affected because the failure may signal existing but yet unrecognized problems at other banks, ignite problems at other banks through spillover or contagion, or foretell adverse economic conditions for the economy in the region or nationwide. ; Unlike previous studies of this type, we examine the impact of bank failure announcements on the market valuation not only of the client firms of the failed banks but on all firms including the clients of surviving banks. We find that, as in previous studies, the market value of customers of the failed banks is adversely affected at the date of the failure announcements. Firms that have greater access to alternative sources of funding experience a less severe adverse impact from bank failure announcements. Similarly, clients of banks that are more profitable, better capitalized, and have lower loan loss reserves suffer less from the failure announcements. However, we also find that these effects are not significantly different from the effects experienced by all firms in the economy. That is, the bank failures represent "bad news" for all firms in the economy, not just for the customers of the failed banks.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its series Pacific Basin Working Paper Series with number 02-09.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfpb:02-09

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mark M. Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2000. "The evolution of "too-big-to-fail" policy in Japan: evidence from market equity values," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 00-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
  2. Slovin, Myron B & Sushka, Marie E & Polonchek, John A, 1993. " The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as Bank Stakeholders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(1), pages 247-66, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ongena, Steven & Smith, David C., 2000. "What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 26-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Yamori, Nobuyoshi & Murakami, Akinobu, 1999. "Does bank relationship have an economic value?: The effect of main bank failure on client firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 115-120, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Malatesta, Paul H., 1986. "Measuring Abnormal Performance: The Event Parameter Approach Using Joint Generalized Least Squares," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(01), pages 27-38, March. [Downloadable!]
  6. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Smirlock, Michael & Kaufold, Howard, 1987. "Bank Foreign Lending, Mandatory Disclosure Rules, and the Reaction of Bank Stock Prices to the Mexican Debt Crisis," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(3), pages 347-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Morck, Randall & Nakamura, Masao & Shivdasani, Anil, 2000. "Banks, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value in Japan," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 539-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. David E. Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, 1998. "On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 635-672, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Miyajima, Hideaki & Yafeh, Yishay, 2003. "Japan's Banking Crisis: Who has the Most to Lose?," CEI Working Paper Series 2003-15, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hideaki Miyajima & Yishay Yafeh, 2003. "Japan's Banking Crisis: Who has the Most to Lose?," Discussion papers 03010, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
  3. David C. Smith, 2002. "Loans to Japanese borrowers," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 02-11, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
  4. David C. Smith, 2003. "Loans to Japanese borrowers," International Finance Discussion Papers 769, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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