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Solvency runs, sunspot runs, and international bailouts

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Mark M. Spiegel

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Abstract

This paper introduces a model of international lender of last resort (ILLR) activity under asymmetric information. The ILLR is unable to distinguish between runs due to debtor insolvency and those which are the result of pure sunspots. Nevertheless, the ILLR can elicit the underlying state of nature from informed creditors by offering terms consistent with generating a separating equilibrium. Achieving the separating equilibrium requires that the ILLR lends to the debtor at sufficiently high rates. This adverse electing problem provides an alternative rationale for Bagehot's Principle of last-resort lending at high rates of interest to the moral hazard motivation commonly found in the literature.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its series Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory with number 2001-05.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Publication status: Published in Journal of International Economics, v. 65, no. 1 (January 2005) pp. 203-219
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfap:2001-05

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Keywords: Financial crises ; Lenders of last resort ; Debt;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 1999. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1241, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries, 1999. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 51-, March.
  3. Dani Rodrik & Andres Velasco, 1999. "Short-Term Capital Flows," NBER Working Papers 7364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Haizhou Huang & C. A. E. Goodhart, 1999. "A Model of the Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 99/39, International Monetary Fund.
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  5. Manmohan S. Kumar & Paul R. Masson & Marcus Miller, 2000. "Global Financial Crises - Institutions and Incentives," IMF Working Papers 00/105, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Boyd, John H. & Smith, Bruce D., 1999. "The Use of Debt and Equity in Optimal Financial Contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 270-316, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Charles Goodhart, 1999. "Myths About the Lender of Last Resort," FMG Special Papers sp120, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ilan Goldfajn & Rodrigo O. Valdés, 1997. "Capital Flows and the Twin Crises : The Role of Liquidity," IMF Working Papers 97/87, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Chang, Roberto & Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Banks, debt maturity and financial crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 169-194, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 1999. "Liquidity crises in emerging markets: Theory and policy," Working Paper 99-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Marchesi, Silvia & Thomas, Jonathan P, 1999. "IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C111-25, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Alonso, Irasema, 1996. "On avoiding bank runs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 73-87, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Williamson, Stephen D, 1987. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 135-45, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1988. "Banking panics, information, and rational expectations equilibrium," Working Papers 320, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  15. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1976. "Optimal Financial Crises," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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  17. V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, 1984. "Banking Panics," Discussion Papers 618, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  18. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Jacklin, Charles J & Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1988. "Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 568-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno M & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2000. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 611-38, August.
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  21. Haibin Zhu, 2000. "Optimal Bank Runs without Self-Fulfilling Prophecies," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1753, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  22. Jeanne, Olivier, 2000. "Debt Maturity and the Global Financial Architecture," CEPR Discussion Papers 2520, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1988. " Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 749-61, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Cooper, Russell & Ross, Thomas W., 1998. "Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 27-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Misa Tanaka, . "Bank loans versus bond finance: implications for sovereign debtors," Bank of England working papers 267, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2008. "Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties," NBER Working Papers 13988, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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