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Imperfect state verification and financial contracting Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Joseph G. Haubrich
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An argument that in a costly state verification model of financial contracting, relaxing the assumption of perfect verification makes the measurement of information difficult.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number
9506.
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Date of creation: 1995Date of revision:
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Keywords: Contracts Information theory References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Lacker, J.M., 1989.
"Optimal Contracts Under Costly State Falsification ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
956, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Other versions: Gorton, Gary B. & Haubrich, Joseph G., 1987.
"Bank deregulation, credit markets, and the control of capital ,"
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 26, pages 289-333.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kim, Son Ku, 1995.
"Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 89-102, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Diamond, Douglas W, 1984.
"Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Singh, Nirvikar, 1991.
"Posterior-preserving information improvements and principal-agent relationships ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 192-202, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Border, Kim C & Sobel, Joel, 1987.
"Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 525-40, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983.
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ronald A. Dye, 1986.
"Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 339-350, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986.
"Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989.
"Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Williamson, Stephen D., 1986.
"Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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