Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

An insider's view of the political economy of the too big to fail doctrine

Contents:

Author Info

  • Walker F. Todd
  • James B. Thomson

Abstract

An explanation of the relationship between interbank exposure and the too big to fail doctrine, with an examination of the interbank exposure of U.S. banks between March 1984 and March 1990.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Workpaper/1990/wp9017.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 9017.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9017

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1455 East 6th St., Cleveland OH 44114
Phone: 216.579.2000
Web page: http://www.clevelandfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: Bank supervision ; Bank failures;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Sherrill Shaffer, 1989. "Pooling intensifies joint failure risk: abstract," Proceedings 249, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  2. Lawrence Kryzanowski & Gordon S. Roberts, 1989. "The performance of the Canadian banking system, 1920-1940," Proceedings 236, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  3. James B. Thomson, 1990. "Using market incentives to reform bank regulation and federal deposit insurance," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 28-40.
  4. Walker F. Todd, 1988. "Lessons of the past and prospects for the future in lender of last resort theory," Working Paper 8805, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  5. Walker F. Todd, 1988. "Lessons of the past and prospects for the future in lender of last resort theory," Proceedings 215, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  6. Thomas M. Humphrey, 1989. "Lender of last resort: the concept in history," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Mar, pages 8-16.
  7. Jack Guttentag & Richard Herring, 1988. "Prudential supervision to manage systemic vulnerability," Proceedings 217, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  8. Schuker, S.A., 1988. "American "Reparations" To Germany, 1919-33: Implication For The Third World Debt Crisi," Princeton Studies in International Economics 61, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  9. Claudia Campbell & Hyman P. Minsky, 1987. "How to get off the back of a tiger, or, do initial conditions constrain deposit insurance reform?," Proceedings 158, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  10. Edward J. Kane, 1989. "How Incentive-Incompatible Deposit-Insurance Funds Fail," NBER Working Papers 2836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. anonymous, 1987. "Large-dollar payment flows from New York," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Win, pages 6-13.
  12. Daria B. Caliguire & James B. Thomson, 1987. "FDIC policies for dealing with failed and troubled institutions," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Oct.
  13. E.J. Stevens, 1989. "Payment system risk issues," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Jun.
  14. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  15. Kryzanowski, Lawrence & Roberts, Gordon S, 1993. "Canadian Banking Solvency, 1922-1940," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(3), pages 361-76, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1999. "Banking consolidation and correspondent banking," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 9-20.
  2. Kane, Edward J., 2001. "Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance: Long-run vs. short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 281-299, August.
  3. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1998. "Depositor preference legislation and failed banks' resolution costs," Proceedings 591, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  4. Phil Molyneux & Klaus Schaeck & Tim Zhou, 2011. "‘Too Systemically Important to Fail’ in Banking," Working Papers 11011, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lee Faulhaber).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.