The authors study how two fiat monies, one safe and one risky, compete in a decentralized trading environment. The equilibrium value of the two currencies, their transaction velocities and agents' spending patterns are endogenously determined. The authors derive conditions under which agents holding diversified currency portfolios spend the safe currency first and hold the risky one for later purchases. They also examine when the reverse spending pattern is optimal.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number
0311.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Camera, Gabriele & Corbae, Dean, 1999.
"Money and Price Dispersion,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 985-1008, November.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Janet Hua, Jiang & Mei, Dong, 2008.
"One or Two Monies?,"
MPRA Paper
14846, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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