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Games with synergistic preferences

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  • Julian C. Jamison
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    Abstract

    In economic situations a player often has preferences regarding not only his or her own outcome but also regarding what happens to fellow players, concerns that are entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down a player's final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper, building on a model due to Bergstrom (1989, 1999), presents a simple structure in the context of game theory that incorporates the "synergies" between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet it is straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied.

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    File URL: http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2011/wp1115.htm
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in its series Working Papers with number 11-15.

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    Date of creation: 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbwp:11-15

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    Related research

    Keywords: Human behavior ; Game theory ; Altruism;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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    1. Barro, Robert J., 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Scholarly Articles 3451399, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
    3. Sally, David, 2001. "On sympathy and games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-30, January.
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