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Household bankruptcy decision: the role of social stigma vs. information sharing

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Abstract

Using a large sample of individual credit information provided by a US credit bureau, this paper investigates the empirical relevance of stigma and information sharing on household bankruptcy and its trend. Many observers of bankruptcy patterns have conjectured that there exists an increased willingness to default that reflects a diminution of social stigma. In this paper, we use a new methodology to disentangle stigma and social learning?two acknowledgedly important social factors affecting default. Although our results indicate a large and important role for stigma, changes in information costs seem to be the more relevant factor in explaining the observed bankruptcy trends. Furthermore, we show that this aggregate trend disguises enormous heterogeneity. While social factors appear quite important among the very poor and less educated, stigma seems to have increased and information costs to have decreased among these very groups. On the contrary, we show that it is primarily among the relatively rich and well educated that stigma has declined. These compositional findings further suggest that the overall increase in the bankruptcy rates cannot be explained by a decrease in social stigma. We argue that the secular increase in bankruptcy is more likely attributable to decreased information costs rather than to changes in social stigma.

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  • Ethan Cohen-Cole & Burcu Duygan-Bump, 2008. "Household bankruptcy decision: the role of social stigma vs. information sharing," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers QAU08-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbqu:qau08-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Kleiner, Kristoph & Stoffman, Noah & Yonker, Scott E., 2021. "Friends with bankruptcy protection benefits," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 578-605.
    2. Ruyi Ge & Juan Feng & Bin Gu, 2016. "Borrower’s default and self-disclosure of social media information in P2P lending," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 2(1), pages 1-6, December.
    3. Cerutti, Eugenio & Dagher, Jihad & Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, 2017. "Housing finance and real-estate booms: A cross-country perspective," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-13.
    4. Weiran Huang & Ashlyn Nelson & Stephen L. Ross, 2018. "Foreclosure Spillovers within Broad Neighborhoods," Working Papers 2018-096, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    5. Mingfeng Lin & Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala & Siva Viswanathan, 2013. "Judging Borrowers by the Company They Keep: Friendship Networks and Information Asymmetry in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(1), pages 17-35, August.
    6. He, Yunwen, 2021. "Using your regular contacts as collateral: The information value of call logs," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    7. Daniel Stone & Basit Zafar, 2014. "Do we follow others when we should outside the lab? Evidence from the AP top 25," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 73-102, August.
    8. Ethan Cohen-Cole, 2009. "The option value of consumer bankruptcy," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers QAU09-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    9. Stefan Angel, 2016. "The Effect of Over-Indebtedness on Health: Comparative Analyses for Europe," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 208-227, May.

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