Payment system settlement and bank incentives
AbstractIn this paper we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves but increases moral hazard problems. The "put option" value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. ; Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Net settlement becomes more attractive relative to gross settlement if bank assets have to be liquidated at less than book value.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number 96-10.
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Review of Financial Studies, Winter 1998
Other versions of this item:
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 1997. "Payment system settlement and bank incentives," Proceedings 537, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, . "Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-32, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Edward J. Green, 1996.
"Money and Debt in the Structure of Payments,"
9609002, EconWPA, revised 09 Sep 1996.
- Green, Edward-J, 1997. "Money and Debt in the Structure of Payments," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 15(1), pages 63-87, May.
- Edward J. Green, 1999. "Money and debt in the structure of payments," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Spr, pages 13-29.
- Bertola, Guiseppe & Caballero, Ricardo J, 1994.
"Irreversibility and Aggregate Investment,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 223-46, April.
- repec:fip:fedhpr:y:1998:i:may:p:206-225 is not listed on IDEAS
- Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 1996.
"Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 733-62, November.
- Caballero, Ricardo J., 1999.
Handbook of Macroeconomics,
in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 813-862
- Scott Freeman, 1993.
"Clearinghouse banks and banknote over-issue,"
9326, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Robert Eisenbeis, 1987. "Eroding market imperfections: implications for financial intermediaries, the payments system, and regulatory reform," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 19-62.
- Bernanke, Ben S, 1990. "Clearing and Settlement during the Crash," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(1), pages 133-51.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Meredith Rector).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.