In this paper we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves but increases moral hazard problems. The "put option" value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. ; Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Net settlement becomes more attractive relative to gross settlement if bank assets have to be liquidated at less than book value.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number
96-10.
Length: Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Review of Financial Studies, Winter 1998 Handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:96-10
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ricardo J. Caballero, 1997.
"Aggregate Investment,"
NBER Working Papers
6264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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