Managerial rents and optimal regulatory intervention in troubled banks
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number 93-6.
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kane, Edward J., 1995. "Three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 431-459, June.
- George Benston & Jocelyn Evan, 2006. "Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 70-92, March.
- Noe, Thomas H. & Rebello, Michael J. & Wall, Larry D., 1996. "Managerial rents and regulatory intervention in troubled banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 331-350, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Meredith Rector).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.