The study consists of four essays, which analyse the implications of labour taxation and unemployment insurance (UI) in the models of imperfectly competitive labour markets. The first essay studies the effects of labour taxation on unemployment and efficiency in a search equilibrium model with endogenous job destruction. It is shown that the adverse employment effect of labour taxes is mainly due to the prolonged spells of unemployment. A pure increase in the tax progression may reduce unemployment and facilitate the emergence of low-productivity jobs. In the second essay, the link between taxes and the public benefits is perceived owing to the centralised wage setting institutions. This is shown to promote wage moderation, make wages and employment less sensitive to wage taxation and reduce hours worked. The third essay considers alternative ways to organize the government subsidies in a model, where taxalike payments are collected by the industry level funds in order to finance unemployment benefits. It is shown that equilibrium unemployment is decreasing in the share of UI financed by the employed union members. The fourth essay analyses the effects of UI in a job search model with endogenous search effort. It is shown that UI with a limited potential duration induces more search effort among the long-term unemployed who have exhausted a considerable amount of the current benefits.
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Paper provided by Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT) in its series Research Reports with number
111.
Length: Date of creation: 20 Jul 2004 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fer:resrep:111
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