Networks with Group Counterproposals
AbstractWe study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2008.61.
Date of creation: Jul 2008
Date of revision:
Efficiency; Bargaining Protocol; Counterproposals; Network Formation; Transfers; Externalities; Groups; Coalitions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2008-09-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2008-09-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2008-09-13 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-09-13 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Suresh Mutuswami & Eyal Winter, 2001.
"Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp264, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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