Giacomo Pasini (Ca' Foscari University in Venice) Paolo Pin (Abdus Salam Internazional Centre for Theoretical Physics) Simon Weidenholzer (Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Wien)
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We analyze a model of price competition ? la Bertrand in a network environment. Firms only have a limited information on the structure of network: they know the number of potential customers they can attract and the degree distribution of customers. This incomplete information framework stimulates the use of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We find that, if there are customers only linked to one firm, but not all of them are, then an equilibrium in randomized strategies fails to exist. Instead, we find a symmetric equilibrium in randomized strategies. Finally, we test our results on US gasoline data. We find empirical evidence consistent with firms playing random strategies.
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2008.28.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Michael R. Baye & John Morgan & Patrick Scholten, 2006.
"Information, Search, and Price Dispersion,"
Working Papers
2006-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
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