When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive tendering. We prove that under complete information extremely severe handicapping is never a credible strategy for the buyer, rather the latter finds it optimal to punish the opportunistic firm so as to make the pool of competitors more alike. In other words, when opportunistic behaviour arises, the buyer should use handicapping to “level the playing field”.
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2008.19.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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