The Rule of The Jungle in Pakistan: A Case Study on Corruption and Forest Management in Swat
AbstractCorruption in the forest sector of Swat, Pakistan is impairing the sustainable management of forest. We analyze corruption in a case study setting against the backdrop of the reform options that are most often cited as possible solutions. As we highlight in this study, the ‘crime and punishment’ approach is not feasibly implemented if the overall institutional environment is weak. Since countrywide overhaul of corruption through sweeping reform programs, the other reform approach, is a difficult and lengthy task, there is a need for an alternative kind of reform. In the case of a corruption-ridden centralised forest management regime, institutional reform should move away from enforcement of existing institutions and promote communal management of natural resources by locals.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2007.91.
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Corruption; Forest Management; Environmental Policy; Institutional Reform;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
- Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2007-10-20 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2007-10-20 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-ENV-2007-10-20 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
- Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
- Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela & Pradhan, Rajendra, 2002. "Legal pluralism and dynamic property rights:," CAPRi working papers 22, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Damania, Richard, 2002. "Environmental controls with corrupt bureaucrats," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(03), pages 407-427, July.
- Lopez, Ramon & Mitra, Siddhartha, 2000. "Corruption, Pollution, and the Kuznets Environment Curve," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 137-150, September.
- Agnes C. Rola & Ian Coxhead, 2005. "Economic development and environmental management in the uplands of Southeast Asia: challenges for policy and institutional development," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 32(s1), pages 243-256, 01.
- Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.