The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games
AbstractQualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best agents to bribe.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2007.100.
Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision:
Bribery; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2008-08-06 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-08-06 (Game Theory)
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