Are EU Environmental Policies Too Demanding for New Members States?
AbstractIn 2004, ten new states entered the European Union. Relative to the pre-2004 member states, these accession states have lower environmental standards, and some worry that it will be too demanding for these new EU members to fully comply with European environmental provisions. In this paper, we assess one rationale for such harmonization. Specifically, we analyze the determinants of environmental policies’ stringency, and show that differences in corruption levels are more important as explanatory factor when compared to income differentials. Since high levels of corruption characterize some countries in the enlarged EU, we argue that this is a good reason for an upward harmonization of environmental policies at the EU level.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2005.46.
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Corruption; European union; Environmental policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2005-04-24 (European Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2005-04-24 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2005-04-24 (Law & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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