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A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games

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Author Info
Michael Finus (Department of Economics, University of Hagen)
Bianca Rundshagen (Department of Economics, University of Hagen)

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Abstract

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the ?-game, we develop an extension called an ?-game. Finally, we compare equilibria in the ?- and ?-game with those in the ?- and ?-game of Hart and Kurz (1983).

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2003.31.

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Date of creation: Mar 2003
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.31

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Related research
Keywords: Core-stability; non-cooperative game theory; positive externality games;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

Cited by:
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  1. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0318, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2003. "How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2003.62, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  3. Porchiung Chou & Cheickna Sylla, 2008. "The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 317-341, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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