Are Political Economists Selfish and Indoctrinated? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Abstract
Most professional economists believe that economists in general are more selfish than other people and that this increased selfishness is due to economics education. This article offers empirical evidence against this widely held belief. Using a unique data set about giving behavior in connection with two social funds at the University of Zurich, it is shown that economics education does not make people act more selfishly. Rather, this natural experiment suggests that the particular behavior of economists can be explained by a selection effect. (JEL A13, A20, H41) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Natural Field Experiments with number 0050.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:feb:natura:0050
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.fieldexperiments.com
For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Trevor Gallen).
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, 2003. "Are Political Economists Selfish and Indoctrinated? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 448-462, July.
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- A20 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S285-300, October.
- Marwell, Gerald & Ames, Ruth E., 1981. "Economists free ride, does anyone else? : Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 295-310, June.
- Carter, John R & Irons, Michael D, 1991. "Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 171-77, Spring.
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
Citations
Blog mentions
As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- So menedžerji slabi državljani?
by d1joze in Damijan blog on 2008-05-24 08:46:00
Cited by:
- Paul Dalziel, 2011. "Schumpeter's 'Vision' and the Teaching of Principles of Economics to Resource Students," International Review of Economic Education, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 10(2), pages 63-74.
- Lisa Anderson & Jennifer Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004.
"Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games,"
Working Papers
0411, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004. "Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games," Working Papers 07, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
- Jeffrey Milyo & Jennifer M. Mellor & Lisa Anderson, 2004. "Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games," Working Papers 0417, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- Stephen Meier & Bruno Frey, 2004.
"Do Business Students Make Good Citizens?,"
International Journal of the Economics of Business,
Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 141-163.
- Stephan Meier & Bruno S. Frey, . "Do Business Students make Good Citizens?," IEW - Working Papers iewwp148, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2005.
"(Why) Are Economists Different?,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1396, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2005. "(Why) are economists different?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 543-562, September.
- Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2004. "(Why) Are Economists Different?," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2004 2004-18, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
- Marco Faravelli, 2006.
"How Context Matters: A Survey Based Experiment on Distributive Justice,"
ESE Discussion Papers
145, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Faravelli, Marco, 2007. "How context matters: A survey based experiment on distributive justice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1399-1422, August.
- Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele & Renner, Elke & Sefton, Martin, 2008.
"Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3914, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2009. "Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000099, David K. Levine.
- Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2008. "Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example," Discussion Papers 2008-16, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Astri Drange Hole, 2008. "How do economists differ from others in distributive situations?," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 023, University of Siena.
- Astrid Dannenberg & Bodo Sturm & Carsten Vogt, 2010. "Do Equity Preferences Matter for Climate Negotiators? An Experimental Investigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(1), pages 91-109, September.
- Emmanuel PETIT (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113) & Anna TCHERKASSOF (LIP/PC2S) & Xavier GASSMANN (INRA), 2011. "Anticipated regret and self-esteem in the Allais paradox," Cahiers du GREThA 2011-25, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
- Jeffrey Milyo & Jennifer M. Mellor & Lisa Anderson, 2005. "Did the Devil Make Them Do It? The Effects of Religion and Religiosity in Public Goods and Trust Games," Working Papers 0512, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2005. "Did the Devil Make Them Do It? The Effects of Religion in Public Goods and Trust Games," Working Papers 20, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
- Amélie Goossens & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2010. "The impact of studying economics, and other disciplines, on the belief that voluntary exchange makes everyone better off," Working Papers CEB 10-012.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:feb:natura:0050For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Trevor Gallen).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

