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Are Political Economists Selfish and Indoctrinated? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

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  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Stephan Meier

Abstract

Most professional economists believe that economists in general are more selfish than other people and that this increased selfishness is due to economics education. This article offers empirical evidence against this widely held belief. Using a unique data set about giving behavior in connection with two social funds at the University of Zurich, it is shown that economics education does not make people act more selfishly. Rather, this natural experiment suggests that the particular behavior of economists can be explained by a selection effect. (JEL A13, A20, H41) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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Paper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Natural Field Experiments with number 0050.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:feb:natura:0050

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  1. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S285-300, October.
  2. Marwell, Gerald & Ames, Ruth E., 1981. "Economists free ride, does anyone else? : Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 295-310, June.
  3. Carter, John R & Irons, Michael D, 1991. "Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 171-77, Spring.
  4. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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  1. So menedžerji slabi državljani?
    by d1joze in Damijan blog on 2008-05-24 08:46:00
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Cited by:
  1. Paul Dalziel, 2011. "Schumpeter's 'Vision' and the Teaching of Principles of Economics to Resource Students," International Review of Economic Education, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 10(2), pages 63-74.
  2. Lisa Anderson & Jennifer Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004. "Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games," Working Papers 0411, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
  3. Stephen Meier & Bruno Frey, 2004. "Do Business Students Make Good Citizens?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 141-163.
  4. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2005. "(Why) Are Economists Different?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1396, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Marco Faravelli, 2006. "How Context Matters: A Survey Based Experiment on Distributive Justice," ESE Discussion Papers 145, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  6. Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele & Renner, Elke & Sefton, Martin, 2008. "Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example," IZA Discussion Papers 3914, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Astri Drange Hole, 2008. "How do economists differ from others in distributive situations?," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 023, University of Siena.
  8. Astrid Dannenberg & Bodo Sturm & Carsten Vogt, 2010. "Do Equity Preferences Matter for Climate Negotiators? An Experimental Investigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(1), pages 91-109, September.
  9. Emmanuel PETIT (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113) & Anna TCHERKASSOF (LIP/PC2S) & Xavier GASSMANN (INRA), 2011. "Anticipated regret and self-esteem in the Allais paradox," Cahiers du GREThA 2011-25, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
  10. Jeffrey Milyo & Jennifer M. Mellor & Lisa Anderson, 2005. "Did the Devil Make Them Do It? The Effects of Religion and Religiosity in Public Goods and Trust Games," Working Papers 0512, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  11. Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2005. "Did the Devil Make Them Do It? The Effects of Religion in Public Goods and Trust Games," Working Papers 20, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
  12. Amélie Goossens & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2010. "The impact of studying economics, and other disciplines, on the belief that voluntary exchange makes everyone better off," Working Papers CEB 10-012.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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