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Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Armin Falk
Andrea Ichino
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While confounding factors typically jeopardize the possibility of using observational data to measure peer effects, field experiments over the potential for obtaining clean evidence. In this paper we measure the output of subjects who were asked to stuff letters into envelopes, with a remuneration completely independent of output. We study two treatments. In the "pair" treatment two subjects work at the same time in the same room. Peer effects are possible in this situation and imply that outputs within pairs should be similar. In the "single" treatment, which serves as a control, subjects work alone in a room and peer effects are ruled out by design. Our main results are as follows: First, we find clear and unambiguous evidence for the existence of peer effects in the pair treatment. The standard deviations of output are significantly smaller within pairs than between pairs. Second, average output in the pair treatment largely exceeds output in the single treatment, i.e., peer effects raise productivity. Third, low productivity workers are significantly more sensitive to the behavior of peers than are high productivity workers. Our findings yield important implications for the design of the workplace.
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Paper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Natural Field Experiments with number
0046.
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Date of creation: 2003Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:feb:natura:0046Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.fieldexperiments.com
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Keywords: peer effects ; field experiments ; incentives ; Other versions of this item:
Paper Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, .
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp144, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
[Downloadable!] Falk, Armin & Ichino, Andrea, 2003.
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
732, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Falk, Armin & Ichino, Andrea, 2003.
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Find related papers by JEL classification: D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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