This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Using Random nth Price Auctions to Value Non-Market Goods and Services

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
John A. List

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Public policy decision making often requires balancing the benefits of a policy with the costs. While regulators in the United States and abroad rely heavily on benefit-cost analysis, critics content that hypothetical bias precludes one of the most popular benefit estimation techniques - contingent surveys-from providing reliable economic values for nonmarket goods and services. This paper explores a new methodology to obtain the total value of nonmarket goods and services - random nth price auctions. The empirical work revolves around examining behavior of 360 participants in a competitive marketplace, where subjects naturally buy, sell, and trade commodities. The field experiment provides some preliminary evidence that hypothetical random nth price auctions can, in certain situations, reveal demand truthfully.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://karlan.yale.edu/fieldexperiments/pdf/List_Using%20Random%20nth%20Price%20Auctions%20to%20Value%20non-market%20Goods.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Framed Field Experiments with number 0045.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:feb:framed:0045

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.fieldexperiments.com

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Trevor Gallen).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1993. "Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 245-61, April.
  2. List, John A. & Shogren, Jason F., 2002. "Calibration of Willingness-to-Accept," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 219-233, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Diamond, Peter A & Hausman, Jerry A, 1994. "Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 45-64, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 961-972, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Maribeth Coller & Melonie Williams, 1999. "Eliciting Individual Discount Rates," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 107-127, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Timothy C. Haab & Ju-Chin Huang & John C. Whitehead, . "Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible? A Comment," Working Papers 9708, East Carolina University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. John A. List, 2001. "Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation Procedures? Evidence from Field Auctions for Sportscards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1498-1507, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Shogren, Jason F. & Margolis, Michael & Koo, Cannon & List, John A., 2001. "A random nth-price auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 409-421, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 2008. "Field Experiments in Economics: The Past, The Present, and The Future," NBER Working Papers 14356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. J.L. Lusk & T. Feldkamp & T.C. Schroeder, 2004. "Experimental Auction Procedure: Impact on Valuation of Quality Differentiated Goods," Artefactual Field Experiments 0069, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All full texts are decentralized with the publishers, none reside on this server, thus making it possible to offer this service for free to all parties.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.