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Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment

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Author Info
Jan Potters
Frans van Winden

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Abstract

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informed sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder. We compare the behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs officials that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission. The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs. Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.

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Paper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Artefactual Field Experiments with number 0072.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:feb:artefa:0072

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kenneth S. Chan & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller, 1998. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 1998-02, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Dyer, Douglas & Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1989. "A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 108-15, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1997. "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 46-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. " Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
  6. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2005. "Cultural Goods and Laboratory Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/06, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised May 2005. [Downloadable!]
  2. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2004. "Cultural Education and the Voluntary Provision of Cultural Goods: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0404003, EconWPA, revised 27 Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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