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The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Martijn Egas
Arno Riedl
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Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this paper we explore the boundary conditions for altruistic punishment to maintain cooperation by systematically varying the cost and impact of punishment, using a subject pool which extends beyond the standard student population. We find that the economics of altruistic punishment lead to the demise of cooperation when punishment is relatively expensive and/or has low impact. Our results indicate that the 'decision to punish' comes from an amalgam of emotional response and cognitive cost-benefit analysis. Additionally, earnings are lowest when punishment promotes cooperation, suggesting that the scope for altruistic punishment as a means to maintain cooperation is limited.
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Paper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Artefactual Field Experiments with number
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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 2005Date of revision:
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000.
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Other versions:
Masclet, D. & Noussair, C. & Tucker, S. & Villeval, M.C., 2001.
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Michael Kosfeld & Arno Riedl, 2004.
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[Downloadable!]
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, 2005.
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Other versions:
Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, 2005.
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Economic Journal ,
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CESifo Working Paper Series
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Stefania Ottone & Ferruccio Ponzano & Luca Zarri, 2008.
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"One Step at a Time: Do Threshold Patterns Matter in Public Good Provision? ,"
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David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008.
"Punishment, inequality, and welfare: a public good experiment ,"
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"Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods ,"
Working Papers in Economics
219, Göteborg University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006.
"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games ,"
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029, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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Other versions:
Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006.
"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2288, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006.
"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
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"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games ,"
Discussion Papers
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[Downloadable!] Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006.
"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games ,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp299, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
[Downloadable!]
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