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Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers

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Author Info
David J. Cooper
John H. Kagel
Wei Lo

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Abstract

We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and magagers with field experience with this situation, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions conducted "in context" making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers, and those without any such references. The dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually, and incompletely, converging on a pooling equilibrium. A fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play. Games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers, with minimal impact on students.

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Paper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Artefactual Field Experiments with number 0034.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:feb:artefa:0034

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Barry W. Ickes & Larry Samuelson, 1987. "Job Transfers and Incentives in Complex Organizations: Thwarting the Ratchet Effect," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 275-286, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Partow, Z. & Schotter, A., 1993. "Does Game Theory Predict Well for the Wrong Reasons: An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 93-46, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Yao, Dennis A., 1988. "Strategic responses to automobile emissions control: A game-theoretic analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 419-438, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dearden, James & Ickes, Barry W & Samuelson, Larry, 1990. "To Innovate or Not to Innovate: Incentives and Innovation in Hierarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1105-24, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Kroll, Yoram & Levy, Haim & Rapoport, Amnon, 1988. "Experimental Tests of the Separation Theorem and the Capital Asset Pricing Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 500-519, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Freixas, Xavier & Guesnerie, Roger & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2), pages 173-91, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Chaudhuri, Ananish, 1998. "The ratchet principle in a principal agent game with unknown costs: an experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Kachelmeier, Steven J & Shehata, Mohamed, 1992. "Examining Risk Preferences under High Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People's Republic of China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1120-41, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Granick, David, 1980. "The ministry as the maximizing unit in Soviet industry," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 255-273, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1993. "Rewards, Experience and Decision Costs in First Price Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 237-45, April.
  12. Cooper, David J & Garvin, Susan & Kagel, John H, 1997. "Adaptive Learning vs. Equilibrium Refinements in an Entry Limit Pricing Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 553-75, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1992. "An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1350-65, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Keren, Michael, 1982. "The ministry, plan changes, and the ratchet in planning," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 327-342, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gari Walkowitz & Sebastian J. Goerg, 2007. "The Janus Face of Cooperation - An Intra- and Cross-Cultural Review," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse5_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Montmarquette, Claude & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie-Claire & Zeiliger, Romain, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," IZA Discussion Papers 1057, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Gary Charness & Antonio Cabrales, 2008. "Optimal Contracts With Team Production And Hidden Information: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 12-08, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Armin Falk & Thomas Dohmen & Uwe Sunde, 2009. "Kontrolliert und repräsentativ: Beispiele zur Komplementarität von Labor- und Felddaten," SOEPpapers 168, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). [Downloadable!]
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  5. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 477-509, June. [Downloadable!]
  6. Vivi Alatas & Lisa Cameron & Ananish Chaudhuri & Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan, 2006. "Subject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A Comparison of Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 975, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2002. "Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse23_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Juan Camilo Cardenas & Elinor Ostrom, 2004. "What do people bring into the game? experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons," Artefactual Field Experiments 0023, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Fiore, Annamaria, 2009. "Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes," MPRA Paper 12498, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Fernando Aguiar & Pablo Brañas-Garza & Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jimenez & Luis Miller, 2009. "Are women expected to be more generous?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 93-98, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Robert Hoffmann & Jin-Yee Tee, 2003. "Adolescent-Adult Interactions and Culture in the Ultimatum Game," Occasional Papers 4, Nottingham University Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Gary Charness & Marie Claire Villeval & Antonio Cabrales, 2009. "Hidden Information, Bargaining Power and Efficiency: An Experiment," Working Papers 2009-08, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Peter Dürsch & Jörg Oechssler & Radovan Vadovic, 2008. "Sick Pay Provision in Experimental Labor Markets," Working Papers 0476, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Paul Healy & John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & Harley Thronson & Peter Ulrich & Giulio Varsi, 2007. "Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 143-167, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Glenn W. Harrison, 2005. "Field Experiments and Control," Artefactual Field Experiments 0049, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
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