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How Do Groups Solve Local Commons Dilemmas? Lessons from Experimental Economics in the Field

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Author Info
Juan Camilo Cardenas

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Abstract

The use of experimental settings to observe human behaviour in a controlled environment of incentives, rules and institutions, has been widely used by the behavioural sciences for some time now, particularly by psychology and economics. In most cases the subjects are college students recruited from one to two hour decision making exercises in which, depending on their choices, they earn cash averaging US$ 20. In such exercises players face a set of feasible actions, rules and incentives (payoffs) involving different forms of social exchange with other people, and that in most cases involve some kind of externalities with incomplete contracts, such as in the case of common-pool resources situations. Depending on the ecological and institutional settings, the resource users face a set of feasible levels of extraction, a set of rules regarding the control or monitoring of individual use, and sometimes ways of imposing material or non-material costs or rewards to those breaking or following the rules. We brought the experimental lab to the field and invited about two hundred users of natural resources in three Columbian rural villages to participate in such decision making exercises and through these and other research instruments we learned about the ways they solve - or fail to - tragedies of the commons with different social institutions. Further, bringing the lab to the field allowed us to explore some of the limitations of existing models about human behavior and its consequences for designing policies for conserving ecosystems and improving social welfare.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Artefactual Field Experiments with number 0016.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:feb:artefa:0016

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Web page: http://www.fieldexperiments.com

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Related research
Keywords: co-operation; experimental economics; experiments; field experiments; collective action common-pool resources; Colombia; reciprocity; trust; reputation; regulation; crowding-out; institutions; game theory;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Juan Camilo Cardenas, 2002. "Real Wealth and Experimental Cooperation: Evidence from Field Experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 0017, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  2. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Maldonado, Jorge H. & Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar, 2008. "Does scarcity exacerbate the tragedy of the commons? Evidence from fishers’ experimental responses," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6528, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  2. Juan Camilo Cardenas & Elinor Ostrom, 2004. "What do people bring into the game? experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons," Artefactual Field Experiments 0023, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Juan Camilo Cardenas, 2002. "Real Wealth and Experimental Cooperation: Evidence from Field Experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 0017, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
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