On the Utility Representation of Asymmetric Single-Peaked Preferences
AbstractWe introduce two natural types of asymmetric single-peaked preferences, which we name biased-above and biased-below, depending on whether the asymmetry (or preference-bias) favors alternatives above or below the peak. We define a rich family of utility functions, the generalized distance-metric utility functions, that can represent preferences biased-above or biased-below, besides accommodating any degree of asymmetry. We also identify restrictions on differentiable utility representations that guarantee the underlying preferences to be biased-above or below, and allow to compare degrees of asymmetry. Finally, we consider a specific application -agents preferences over government size- to illustrate the role of factors such as risk aversion and tax distortions in shaping asymmetric preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by FEDEA in its series Working Papers with number 2011-03.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- Francisco Martinez Mora & M. Socorro Puy, 2011. "On the utility representation of asymmetric single-peaked preferences," Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Leicester 11/18, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Jul 2011.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-02-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-05 (Game Theory)
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- Francisco Javier Ruge-Murcia, 2001.
"Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences,"
IMF Working Papers
01/161, International Monetary Fund.
- Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J, 2003. " Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 763-85, October.
- Ruge-Murcia, F.J., 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en Ã©conomie quantitative, CIREQ 2001-04, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco .J., 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2001-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Banco de Espaï¿½a Working Papers 0106, Banco de Espa�a.
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