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Fiscal Discipline as a Social Norm: The European Stability Pact

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Author Info
Jean-Paul Fitoussi (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques)
Francesco Saraceno () (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques)

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Abstract

This paper reviews the arguments for and against the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ signed by the countries of the Euro area. We find the theoretical debate to be inconclusive, as both externality and credibility arguments can be used to yield opposite, and equally plausible conclusions. We also argue that evidence in favour of a Pact-like rule is scant. We therefore suggest the view that the Stability Pact is a public social norm, and that a country’s adherence to that norm is in fact a response to the need to preserve reputation among the other members of the European Union. Using this extreme but not implausible hypothesis, we build a simple model similar in spirit to Akerlof’s (1980) seminal paper on social norms, and we show that reputation issues may cause the emergence of a stable but inferior equilibrium. We further show that after the enlargement, with a number of countries anxious to prove their ‘soundness’ joining the club, the problems posed by the pact/social norm are likely to increase.

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Paper provided by Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE) in its series Documents de Travail de l'OFCE with number 2007-22.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:fce:doctra:0722

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Related research
Keywords: Stability Pact Fiscal Rules Fiscal Policy Social Norms Reputation Enlargement

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization

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  1. Buti, Marco & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Franco, Daniele, 2005. "The Stability Pact Pains: A Forward-Looking Assessment of the Reform Debate," CEPR Discussion Papers 5216, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Ardagna, Silvia & Caselli, Francesco & Lane, Timothy, 2004. "Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 4661, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Frank, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "Stability and Growth Pact: issues and lessons from political economy," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 65-89, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marco Catenaro & Patrizio Tirelli, 2000. "Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Co-ordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets ?," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 0002, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1990. "Can Severe Fiscal Contractions be Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries," NBER Working Papers 3372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Carsten Detken & Vítor Gaspar & Bernhard Winkler, 2004. "On prosperity and posterity: the need for fiscal discipline in a monetary union," Working Paper Series 420, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Jensen, Henrik, 1996. "The advantage of international fiscal cooperation under alternative monetary regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 485-504, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Yash P. Mehra, 1992. "Deficits and long-term interest rates: an empirical note," Working Paper 92-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  10. Stuart Landon & Constance E. Smith, 2000. "Government debt spillovers and creditworthiness in a federation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 634-661, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Alberto Alesina et al., 2002. "Fiscal Policy, Profits, and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 571-589, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Allsopp, Christopher & Davies, Gareth & Vines, David, 1995. "Regional Macroeconomic Policy, Fiscal Federalism, and European Integration," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 126-44, Summer.
  13. Akerlof, George A, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Bernoth, Kerstin & Schuknecht, Ludger & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2004. "Sovereign Risk Premia in the European Bond Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 4465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Fiscal Policy In Good Times And Bad," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1399-1436, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Andersen, Torben M. & Sorensen, Jan Rose, 1995. "Unemployment and fiscal policy in an economic and monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 27-43, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Caporale, Guglielmo Maria & Williams, Geoffrey, 2002. "Long-term nominal interest rates and domestic fundamentals," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 119-130. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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