Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On Capturing Rent from a Non-Renewable Resource International Monopoly

Contents:

Author Info

  • Rubio Jorge Santiago J.

    ()
    (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA)

Abstract

In this working paper we model the case of an international non-renewable resource monopolist as a dynamic game between a monopolist and importing countries governments, and we investigate whether a tariff on resource imports can be advantageous for the consumers of the importing countries when the monopolist sets the price and the importing countries governments act in a non-cooperative way. We find that a tariff is advantageous for the consumers even when there is no commitment to the trade policy, although the part of the rent that can be reaped by the importing countries decreases substantially with the number of importing countries. The optimality of the tariff in our dynamic game is explained by the fact that through the tariff the governments of the importing countries can influence the dynamics of the accumulated extractions and hence the extraction costs and the evolution of the monopolist price.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.fbbva.es/TLFU/tlfu/ing/publicaciones/documentos/fichadoc/index.jsp?codigo=246
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation in its series Working Papers with number 201089.

as in new window
Length: 52
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fbb:wpaper:201089

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Plaza de San Nicolás, 4, 48005 Bilbao
Phone: +34 94 487 52 52
Fax: +34 94 424 46 21
Email:
Web page: http://www.fbbva.es
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Tariffs; non-renewable resources; depletion effects; price-setting monopolist; differential games; linear strategies; Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fbb:wpaper:201089. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.