This paper studies whether the dynamic behavior of real GDP, unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and by changes of governments in the Czech Republic. Two basic models of political cycles are tested – the political business cycle models and the partisan theories. The political business cycle models emphasize opportunistic behavior of politics who strive to achieve own reelection regardless of their party membership. On the other hand partisan politicians are faithful to their ideological opinions and therefore they attract only specific number of people. The results of the tests partly confirmed validity of opportunistic motivations in behavior of the Czech politicians. On the contrary suppositions of the partisan theories were not proved.
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Paper provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its series Working Papers IES with number
2007/18.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions