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The Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Budget Cost of the Czech Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund

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Abstract

The paper analyzes the government budget cost of credit guarantees and subsidies. The analysis is done both in a general qualitative manner and quantitatively for the case of Czech Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF). In the quantitative part of the paper we show that the portfolio of the SGAFF has a sufficient value to cover expected costs of credit guarantees and subsidies provided by the SGAFF. The qualitative theoretical model is dealing with government interventions designed to decrease the credit rationing of good farmers. The theoretical model shows that with uniform non-targeted supports the budget cost minimizing government unambiguously prefers lump-sum guarantees to interest rate subsidies. With supports targeted fully to disadvantaged farmers the government is indifferent between lump-sum guarantees, proportional guarantees and interest rates subsidies as far as the government budget costs are concerned.

Suggested Citation

  • Karel Janda, 2005. "The Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Budget Cost of the Czech Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund," Working Papers IES 86, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp086
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Karel Janda, 2003. "Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2003(4), pages 331-349.
    2. Karel Janda, 2005. "The Comparative Statics of the Effects of Credit Guarantees and Subsidies in the Competitive Lending Market," Working Papers IES 82, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
    3. Gale, William G, 1991. "Economic Effects of Federal Credit Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 133-152, March.
    4. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    5. Karel Janda, 1994. "Modelování rizika akciového portfolia (Modelling Risks of Share Portfolio)," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 44(9), pages 463-472, September.
    6. Bruce D. Smith & Michael J. Stutzer, 1989. "Credit Rationing and Government Loan Programs: A Welfare Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(2), pages 177-193, June.
    7. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    8. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 651-666.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kateřina Tsolov, 2005. "ADR/GDR Potential in Central Europe," Working Papers IES 92, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
    2. Adam Geršl, 2007. "Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 67-86, March.
    3. Kodera J. & Vosvrda M., 2005. "Production, Capital Stock and Price Dynamics in Simple Model of Closed Economy," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 287, Society for Computational Economics.
    4. Tomáš Cahlík & Tomáš Honzák & Jana Honzáková & Marcel Jiřina & Natálie Reichlová, 2005. "Convergence of Consumption Structure," Working Papers IES 99, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
    5. Miloslav Vošvrda & Lukáš Vácha, 2007. "Heterogeneous Agents Model with the Worst Out Algorithm," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 54-66, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transition; Credit; Subsidies; Guarantees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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