The Macroeconomics of Delegated Management
AbstractWe are interested in the macroeconomic implications of the separation of ownership and control. An alternative decentralized interpretation of the stochastic growth model is proposed, one where shareholders hire a self-interested manager who is in charge of the firm’s hiring and investment decisions. Delegation is seen to give rise to a generic conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. This conflict fundamentally results from the different income base of the two types of agents, once aggregate market clearing conditions are taken into account. An optimal contract exists resulting in an observational equivalence between the delegated management economy and the standard representative agent business cycle model. The optimal contract, however, appears to be miles away from standard practice: the manager’s remuneration is tied to the firm’s total income net of investment expenses, abstracting totally from wage costs. In order to align the interest of a manager more conventionally remunerated on the basis of the firm’s operating results to those of stockholder-workers, the manager must be made nearly risk neutral. We show the limited power of convex contracts to accomplish this goal and the necessity, if the manager is too risk averse (log or higher than log), of considerably downplaying the incentive features of his remuneration. The difficulty in reconciling the viewpoints of a manager with powers of delegation and of a representative firm owner casts doubt on the descriptive validity of the macro-dynamics highlighted in the representative agent macroeconomic model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering in its series FAME Research Paper Series with number rp88.
Date of creation: Jun 2003
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business cycles; delegated management; contracting;
Other versions of this item:
- J.B. Donaldson & J.P. Danthine, 2004. "The Macroeconomics of Delegated Management," 2004 Meeting Papers 289, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Danthine, Jean-Pierre & Donaldson, John B, 2003. "The Macroeconomics of Delegated Management," CEPR Discussion Papers 4008, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jean-Pierre DANTHINE & John B. DONALDSON, 2003. "The Macroeconomics of Delegated Management," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2005-04-16 (Business Economics)
- NEP-DGE-2005-04-16 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2005-04-16 (Macroeconomics)
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