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Private Goods, Public Goods and Common Pools with Homo Reciprocans

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  • James C. Cox

Abstract

Familiar inefficiencies arise with competing interests over private goods in Stackelberg and investment games. Private good experiments reveal whether reciprocity enhances cooperative outcomes. Familiar social dilemmas arise with voluntary provision of public goods and voluntary appropriation from common pools. Experiments with pairs of payoff-equivalent provision and appropriation games reveal whether reciprocity is more or less effective in ameliorating under-provision or over-appropriation. Experiments with asymmetric provision and appropriation games also yield insight into the effects of the Indian caste system on inefficiency from social dilemmas. Experiments with three types of games, with a private good, public good or common pool, provide diagnostic tests of the homo reciprocans model. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.1

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Paper provided by Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series with number 2012-06.

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Length: 19
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2012-06

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  1. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869, August.
  2. James C. Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2007. "On Modeling Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Public Finance Review, , vol. 35(2), pages 311-332, March.
  3. Subhasish Dugar & Haimanti Bhattacharya & David Reiley, 2012. "Can'T Buy Me Love? A Field Experiment Exploring The Trade‐Off Between Income And Caste‐Status In An Indian Matrimonial Market," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 534-550, 04.
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Cited by:
  1. James Alm, 2013. "Expanding the Theory of Tax Compliance from Individual to Group Motivations," Working Papers 1309, Tulane University, Department of Economics.

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