Environmental Policy and the Energy Eficiency of Vertically Differentiated Consumer Products
AbstractWe analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in terms of the energy efficiency of products. Considering energy taxes, subsidies to firms for investment in more eco-friendly products, and product standards, we are particularly interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental goals shape the choice of policy instruments. We Önd that an industry-friendly government levies an energy tax to supplement a lax product standard, but shies away from subsidies to firms. By contrast, a consumer-friendly government relies heavily on a strict product standard and additionally implements a moderate subsidy to firms, but avoids energy taxes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder) in its series Discussion Paper Series RECAP15 with number 006.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2012
Date of revision:
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Energy tax; energy efficiency standard; subsidy; vertically differentiated markets; product quality;
Other versions of this item:
- Brzeskot, Magdalena & Haupt, Alexander, 2013. "Environmental policy and the energy efficiency of vertically differentiated consumer products," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 444-453.
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2013-01-19 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-01-19 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2013-01-19 (Regulation)
- NEP-RES-2013-01-19 (Resource Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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