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Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games

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Author Info
Battigalli, P.

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Abstract

The authors argue that the rationalizability approach is particularly appropriate to analyze games with genuine incomplete information.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number eco99/17.

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Length: 63 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco99/17

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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION ; GAME THEORY;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

Cited by:
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  3. repec:bep:theadv:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1073-1073 is not listed on IDEAS
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  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1609RR, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, . "Rationalizable Bidding in General First-Price Auctions," Working Papers 190, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First Price Discrete Auctions," Discussion Papers 1308, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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