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Voting and Decisions in the ECB

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  • Brueckner, M.
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    Abstract

    This paper analyses the interaction between decisions on monetary policy in the future European Central Bank and different voting mechanisms. Using a simple stochastic model for preferences over monetary policy it is shown that the voting mechanism described in the actual statute leads to inefficient outcomes. The paper shows as well that the inefficiency can be resolved by allowing for sidepayments. The optimal monetary policy can be implemented by a noncooperative bargaining game.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number eco97/29.

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    Length: 41 pages
    Date of creation: 1997
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco97/29

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    Related research

    Keywords: BARGAINING ; MONETARY AREAS ; VOTING;

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    Cited by:
    1. Gambacorta, Leonardo, 2003. "Asymmetric bank lending channels and ECB monetary policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 25-46, January.
    2. Aksoy, Yunus & De Grauwe, Paul & Dewachter, Hans, 2002. "Do asymmetries matter for European monetary policy?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 443-469, March.
    3. Dixit, Avinash, 2001. "Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 589-613, May.

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