A well-known result from the analysis of the monetary policy coordination of two countries is that coordination of the two policies pareto-dominates the outcome of the non-cooperative game. Hence, both countries will always have an incentive to form a Union when it is ensured that the other country joins it as well. We show in a n-country (symmetric) framework that the two-country result cannot be extended straightforwardly.
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Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number
eco96/07.
Length: 35 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco96/07
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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