Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Measuring International Risk-Sharing: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries

Contents:

Author Info

  • Francesca Viani

Abstract

Whether financial market integration raised global insurance is a crucial, still open issue. All empirical methods to measure cross-border risk-sharing are based on the implicit assumption that international prices do not fluctuate in response to business cycle shocks. This paper shows that these methods can be completely misleading in the presence of large fluctuations in international prices as those observed in the data. I then propose a new empirical method that is immune from this issue. The risk-sharing inefficiency between two countries is measured by the wedge between their Stochastic Discount Factors (SDFs). This measure is a proxy for the welfare losses created by imperfect insurance. Welfare losses can be attributed either to the strength of uninsurable shocks (the extent of risk to be pooled) or to the degree of insurance against different sources of risk. The method is applied to study the evolution of risk-sharing between the US and OECD countries, assuming either constant or time-varying risk-aversion. The degree of insurance is found to have improved over time only for some countries and only if SDFs are estimated assuming time-varying risk-aversion. The results are also informative on the implications of different macro models for international risk. When confronted with the data, standard open-macro models (featuring constant risk-aversion) imply that nominal exchange rate fluctuations do not contain wealth divergences across countries, but rather represent an important source of risk. Time-varying risk-aversion instead implies that limiting welfare losses from imperfect risk-sharing requires reducing the volatility of macro fundamentals.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/15956/ECO_2011_10.pdf?sequence=1
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number ECO2011/10.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2011/10

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy
Phone: +39-055-4685.982
Fax: +39-055-4685.902
Web page: http://www.eui.eu/ECO/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Anna Lipinska & Bianca De Paoli, 2013. "Capital Controls: a Normative Analysis," 2013 Meeting Papers 861, Society for Economic Dynamics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2011/10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marcia Gastaldo).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.