Growth Externalities, Unions, and Long-term Wage Accords
AbstractThis paper presents an innovation driven endogenous growth model, where firms and unions bargain over wages. We find that the degree of centralization of the bargaining structure plays a crucial rule for economic performance. Central bargaining, which incorporates the leapfrogging externality incorporated in firm-level bargaining, will yield lower rates of unemployment for a given rate of economic growth.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number eco2000/18.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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UNEMPLOYMENT ; WAGES ; LABOUR;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- O41 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
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