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Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Markets: Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan, Germany, France, the UK and USA

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Author Info
Gregory JACKSON
MIYAJIMA Hideaki
Abstract

This paper compares the characteristics of M&A in 1991-2005 across five countries: Japan, France, Germany, the UK and USA. We ask what factors explain the growth of M&A markets across these countries, and what similarities and differences exist in the ways the M&A market operates. We find that the growth of M&A reflects a rather similar combination of sectoral, international, and financial factors. However, despite some convergence toward increasing levels, we find important differences in the characteristics of M&A transactions that reflect institutional differences found within different national 'varieties of capitalism'. We find systematic differences between what Hall and Soskice (2001) call liberal market economies (UK and USA) and coordinated market economies (Japan, France, and Germany) across a wide range of in deal characteristics: takeover bids, the size of stakes purchased, the prior stakes held, the use of private negotiation, degree of hostility, and takeover premium. In line with theories of the social embeddedness of markets (Granovetter 1985), we find that in countries with 'coordinated' market economies, M&A reflects greater 'coordination' of transactions through on going business relations. As such, the market for corporate control does not necessary entail a convergence of national business systems, but a pattern of change influenced by strong continuities.

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Paper provided by Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in its series Discussion papers with number 07054.

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Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:07054

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  3. Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Takeover waves : triggers, performance and motives," Discussion Paper 29, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Mari Sako & Gregory Jackson, 2006. "Strategy meets institutions: The transformation of management-labor relations at Deutsche Telekom and NTT," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 59(3), pages 347-366, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sigurt Vitols, 2005. "Changes in Germany's Bank-Based Financial System: implications for corporate governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 386-396, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Goergen, Marc & Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Corporate governance convergence: evidence from takeover regulation reforms in Europe," Discussion Paper 63, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 1999. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," CSEF Working Papers 29, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Conyon, Martin J. & Girma, Sourafel & Thompson, Steve & Wright, Peter W., 2002. "The impact of mergers and acquisitions on company employment in the United Kingdom," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 31-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Marc Goergen, 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 243-268, Summer.
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  16. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 2003. "Stock market driven acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 295-311, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Gregory Jackson, 2005. "Stakeholders under Pressure: corporate governance and labour management in Germany and Japan," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 419-428, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 33-68 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, 2001. "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s," NBER Working Papers 8220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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