Vote-Buying and Growth
AbstractVote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote buying prohibitively costly.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich in its series CER-ETH Economics working paper series with number 08/94.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision:
vote-buying; political economy; poverty traps; economic development; voting rules; repeated voting;
Other versions of this item:
- Gersbach, Hans & Mühe, Felix, 2011. "Vote-Buying And Growth," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(05), pages 656-680, November.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-09-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-09-29 (Positive Political Economics)
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