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Vote-Buying and Growth

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Author Info
Hans Gersbach () (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
Felix Mühe () (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland)

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Abstract

Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote buying prohibitively costly.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich in its series CER-ETH Economics working paper series with number 08/94.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:08-94

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Related research
Keywords: vote-buying; political economy; poverty traps; economic development; voting rules; repeated voting;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - General
O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Docquier, Frederic & Tarbalouti, Essaid, 2001. " Bribing Votes: A New Explanation to the "Inequality-Redistribution" Puzzle in LDCs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(3-4), pages 259-72, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ulrich Erlenmaier & Hans Gersbach, 2001. "Flexible Majority Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bell, Clive & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "Child Labor and the Education of a Society," IZA Discussion Papers 338, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Barro, Robert J, 2000. " Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 5-32, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Galor, Oded & Zeira, Joseph, 1993. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(1), pages 35-52, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Costas Azariadis, 1996. "The Economics of Poverty Traps Part One: Complete Markets," Working Papers 9606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    Other versions:
  7. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004. "Vote Buying," Discussion Papers 1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005. "Vote Buying," Others 0503006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005. "Vote buying," Working Papers 1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  8. Saqib Jafarey & Sajal Lahiri, 2001. "Child Labour," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, PO Box 69, Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, RG9 1GB, vol. 2(1), pages 69-93, January. [Downloadable!]
  9. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 38-67, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hans Gersbach & Lars Siemers, 2005. "Can Democracy Educate a Society?," IZA Discussion Papers 1693, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  11. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 565-611, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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