Aggregation of endogenous information in large elections
AbstractWe study aggregation of information when voters can collect information of different precision, with increased precision entailing an increasing marginal cost. In order to properly understand the incentives to collect information we introduce another dimension of heterogeneity: on top of the ideological dimension we allow for different levels of intensity in preferences. Contrary to traditional models of endogenous information, in equilibrium, there are voters collecting information of different qualities. After characterizing all symmetric Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies for arbitrary rules of election and fairly general distribution of types. We study information aggregation in symmetric electorates and show that information aggregates even when voters collect information of different qualities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 733.
Date of creation: 01 May 2013
Date of revision:
Postal: Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-11-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2013-11-09 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-11-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-11-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-11-09 (Positive Political Economics)
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