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Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values

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  • David S. Ahny
  • Santiago Oliveros

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Abstract

Consider the problem of deciding a winner among three alternatives when voters have common values, but private information regarding the values of the alternatives. We compare approval voting with other scoring rules. For any finite electorate, the best equilibrium under approval voting is more efficient than either plurality rule or negative voting. If any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information in large elections, then approval voting must do so as well.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 732.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 2013
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Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:732

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References

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  1. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. GOERTZ, Johanna M.M. & MANIQUET, François, . "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2326, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Discussion Papers 1214, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Cited by:
  1. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," THEMA Working Papers 2013-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Matias Nunez, 2013. "The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-00917101, HAL.
  3. Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games," Working Papers hal-00914890, HAL.
  4. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, 2011. "Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election," KASBIT Journal of Management & Social Science, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 4, pages 77-88, December.
  6. GOERTZ, Johanna & MANIQUET, François, 2013. "Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2013023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election," MPRA Paper 50674, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Apr 2011.

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