Bilateral Trading in Networks
AbstractWe study an incomplete-information model of sequential bargaining for a single object, with the novel feature that agents are located in a network. In each round of trade, the current owner of the object either consumes it or makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to some connected trader. Traders may buy in order to consume or to resale to others. We show that the equilibrium price dynamics is non-monotone and that traders that intermediate the object arise endogenously and attain a pro t. We also provide insights on how traders' equilibrium payoffs depend on their location in the network.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 704.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Postal: Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-INT-2012-03-08 (International Trade)
- NEP-MIC-2012-03-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2012-03-08 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2002.
"Optimal Auction with Resale,"
Staff General Research Papers
12664, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004.
"Monopoly with Resale,"
1393, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Monopoly with Resale," Working Papers 2003.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1405, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Parkes, David C. & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2009. "Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 1-1, September.
- Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 2003. "A decentralized market with trading links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 83-103, February.
- BEDAYO, Mikel & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2012.
"Bargaining and delay in trading networks,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2012046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Daniele Condorelli & Andrea Galeotti, 2012. "Endogenous Trading Networks," Economics Discussion Papers 705, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Essex Economics Web Manager).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.