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Substitution Between (and Motivations for) Charitable Contributions: An Experimental Study

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David Reinstein ()

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Abstract

I run a series of laboratory experiments to estimate and describe the extent to which an individual’s charitable donation to one cause displaces his or her giving to another cause. The experiments also investigate motivations for giving, including the simple warm-glow and public-goods models, and the desire for influence, reputation, and normalizing behavior. In the first wave of experiments I allow 49 subjects to donate or keep any amount of their $10 "endowment" to any of three charities in each of six stages (with one stage randomly chosen for payments). Some of the stages include "shocks" (to certain charities), such as an expanded choice set, a higher "match" rate, and a promotional video. The second wave of experiments (48 subjects) has 13 stages, a larger set of treatments, and a $20 "endowment". All of the treatments have the hypothesized effect on giving, including the "price" shock; in contrast to previous experiments, the subjects exhibit price-elastic demand. Subjects also give significantly more when their decisions and identity are observed. The results demonstrate that "expenditure substitution" among charities can be seen in a laboratory setting. I find large own-price elasticities and very large cross-price elasticities - these charities are gross substitutes in the conventional sense. The substitution is stronger where the charities serve similar purposes, such as UNICEF and Care. In the "reduced form" model, using instrumental variables estimation, I estimate an expenditure substitution coefficient of 37% - when gifts to one charity are increased (or decreased) by a certain amount because of a shock, the sum of gifts to other charities decreases by 37% of this amount. The conditional-on-positive estimate of this substitution is 80%: where gifts to both charities remain positive, the "crowding out" is $0.80 for every $1.

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Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 648.

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Date of creation: 22 Oct 2007
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Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:648

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  1. Falk, Armin, 2004. "Charitable Giving as a Gift Exchange: Evidence From a Field Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 4189, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 215-233, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. David A. Reinstein, 2006. "Does One Contribution Come at the Expense of Another? Empirical Evidence on Substitution Between Charitable Donations," Economics Discussion Papers 618, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Feldstein, Martin S & Taylor, Amy, 1976. "The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(6), pages 1201-22, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Pollak, Robert A, 1969. "Conditional Demand Functions and Consumption Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 83(1), pages 60-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Frey, Bruno S. & Meier, Stephan, 2004. "Pro-social behavior in a natural setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 65-88, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena, 1998. "An experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis: The nature of beneficent behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 315-331, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Andreoni, James, 2006. "Philanthropy," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Harbaugh, William T, 1998. "The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 277-82, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. J. M. C. Santos Silva & Silvana Tenreyro, 2006. "The Log of Gravity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(4), pages 641-658, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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