Merger Policy, Entry, and Entrepreneurship
AbstractWe assess the impact of merger policy on entry and entrepreneurship. Facing uncertainty about its prospects and foreseeing that it may wish to quit should profitability prove poor, a rational entrant considers possible exit routes. Horizontal merger reduces competition subsequently, lowering welfare in the short run, but also provides a valuable exit route. By facilitating exit and thus raising the value of entry, more lenient merger policy may stimulate entry sufficiently that welfare is increased overall. We calculate the optimal merger policy in the form of a low, but positive, profitability threshold below which a merger is permitted despite its adverse impact on post-merger competition. This may be viewed as an extension of the "failing firm defence" to include ailing, low profitability firms as well as imminently failing ones. The implications of strategic firm behaviour for the optimal policy are examined, and merger policy is compared with an entry subsidy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 634.
Date of creation: 17 Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Postal: Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.
Other versions of this item:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-08-27 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-08-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENT-2007-08-27 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-IND-2007-08-27 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-08-27 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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