Downstream Competition, Bargaining and Welfare
Abstract
I analyse the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. In both cases, standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.Download Info
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Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 625.Length:
Date of creation: 02 Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:625
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Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- George Symeonidis, 2008. "Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 247-270, 03.
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-03-10 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-03-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2007-03-10 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-03-10 (Microeconomics)
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Alberto Iozzi & Tommaso Valletti, 2010.
"Vertical bargaining and countervailing power,"
CEIS Research Paper
160, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 28 May 2010.
- Valletti, T & Iozzi, A, . "Vertical bargaining and countervailing power," Working Papers 5958, Imperial College, London, Imperial College Business School.
- Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima & Susumu Cato, 2009. "Relative Performance and R&D Competition," ISER Discussion Paper 0752, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Chrysovalantou Milliou & Apostolis Pavlou, 2009. "Upstream Horizontal Mergers and Efficiency Gains," CESifo Working Paper Series 2748, CESifo Group Munich.
- Symeonidis, George, 2010.
"Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly,"
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- George Symeonidis, 2009. "Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Papers 671, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Product Market Cooperation, Profits and Welfare in the Presence of Labor Union," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 151-160, June.
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