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Group Strategyproofness in Queueing Models

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Author Info
Manipushpak Mitra
Suresh Mutuswami ()

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Abstract

We examine the tradeoffs between two variants of group strategyproofness, efficiency and budget balance in queueing models. In general, group strategyproofness is incompatible with efficiency and budget balance. Weakening budget balance to feasibility, we show that the incompatibility persists with strong group strategyproofness. We then identify a necessary condition for weak group strategyproofness and efficiency and use it to show that these two requirements are incompatible with budget balance unless there are exactly three agents. We also demonstrate the compatibility when there are three agents. Finally, we identify a class of efficient and weak group strategyproof mechanisms that we call k-pivotal mechanisms and identify the complete subclass of these mechanisms that are feasible.

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Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 610.

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Date of creation: 19 Apr 2006
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Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:610

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2004. "Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 257-279, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Manipushpak Mitra, 2002. "Achieving the first best in sequencing problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 75-91. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Mitra, Manipushpak, 2005. "Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 165(1), pages 251-266, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1996. "Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Access Costs: Budget Balance versus Efficiency," Working Papers 96-31, Duke University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Moulin, H., 1986. "Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Manipushpak Mitra, 2000. "Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1301, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  7. Maniquet, Francois, 2003. "A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 90-103, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Jeroen Suijs, 1996. "On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 193-209, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-44, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Kayi, Çağatay & Ramaekers, Eve, 2008. "An Impossibility in Sequencing Problems," Research Memoranda 040, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2008. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
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